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Abstract European Union (EU) foreign policy has long been considered the domaine réservé 
of the member states. This article challenges such conventional state-centered wisdom by analyzing 
the influence of the Brussels-based EU officials in the Common Security and Defence Policy. Using 
four case studies and data from 105 semi-structured interviews, it shows that EU officials are most  
influential in the agenda-setting phase and more influential in civilian than in military operations. 
Their prominence in agenda-setting can be explained by their central position in the policy process. 
This allows them to get early involved in the operations. The absence of strong control mechanisms 
and doctrine in  civilian crisis  management gives them opportunities to affect civilian missions. 
Finally, EU officials direct civilian operations from Brussels, whereas the command of military 
operations is with the member states and NATO.
Key words European Union, CSDP, security policy, EU officials, influence, rational choice 
institutionalism
INTRODUCTION
European Union (EU) foreign policy has long been considered the domaine réservé of the member 
states.1 Contrary to other parts of European integration, it ran almost completely without the support 
of the Brussels-based institutions for nearly 30 years.  The six-monthly rotating Presidency was 
responsible for convening meetings, issuing declarations, and occasionally speaking on behalf of 
the EU (e.g. Nuttall 2000, Smith 2004). By keeping these functions ‘in-house’, the member states 
kept their sovereignty costs to a minimum and benefited at the same time from cooperation in the 
sensitive area of foreign policy.
This intergovernmental practice dramatically changed with the Treaty of Amsterdam and the 
Cologne European Council in 1999.2 The member states strengthened their machinery by creating 
1 EU foreign policy refers to European Political Cooperation (1970–1993) and the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (1993-date).
2 There is evidence of some ‘Brusselisation’ before this date. After the Single European Act (1987), a small-scale 
foreign policy secretariat was established and several working groups started to meet in Brussels, see Nuttall (1992, 
2the  post  of  the  High Representative  for  the  Common Foreign  and Security  Policy  (CFSP).  In 
support, they established a Policy Unit, nominated EU Special Representatives, and increased the 
staff of the Directorate-General for External Relations (DG E). To carry out civilian and military 
operations,  they  created  two crisis  management  directorates,  a  sizeable  military  staff  (EUMS),  
civilian planning and operations headquarters (CPCC), and an intelligence capability (SITCEN). 
These services were located in the Council Secretariat until the Treaty of Lisbon (2009). They are 
currently part of the European External Action Service (EEAS).3
The creation of these foreign policy bureaucracies in Brussels is undoubtedly one of the 
most remarkable recent institutional developments in the EU. Small  wonder that it  has attracted 
academic attention. Various observers – from very different theoretical perspectives – explain why 
the member states have delegated new foreign policy functions to Brussels (e.g. Christiansen 2002, 
Christiansen and Vanhoonacker 2008, Dijkstra 2008, 2010a). Little is known, however, about the 
effects of these developments. This article  analyses, in this respect,  under which conditions EU 
officials exert influence in the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Influence is defined 
as getting the member states to do something they would otherwise not have done (cf. Dahl 1957).  
Given the  consensus  of  decision-making,  the  member states  are  conceptualized as  a  collective 
principal (cf. Nielson and Tierney 2003). EU officials refer to the High Representative and the civil 
servants working in the various CSDP services.
Providing empirical evidence from four case studies, this article finds that EU officials exert 
most influence in the agenda-setting phase of the policy process and more influence in civilian than 
in military operations. Their prominence in agenda-setting can be explained by their central position 
in  policy-making. Such position allows them to become very early  involved in  planning.  They 
contribute to the framing of missions and the construction of faits accomplis.  Their  strength in 
civilian crisis management results from the absence of strong control mechanisms and doctrine. 
Even though the member states have three controlling military committees,  they have only one 
relatively  junior  civilian  committee.  EU  officials  furthermore  direct  civilian  operations  from 
Brussels, while the command of military operations is with the member states and North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO). Finally, the lack of doctrine makes it difficult for the member states to 
control civilian crisis management.
This  article  starts  with  a  discussion  of  the  conditions  for  influence  – the  resources  and 
opportunities of the EU officials as well as the control mechanisms of the member states. It then 
analyses the influence of the EU officials during the crisis management operations in Bosnia, Chad, 
Aceh, and Kosovo. These cases vary across issues (civilian/military), regions (Europe/non-Europe) 
and time (2004–2005/2007–2008). As such they give us comprehensive insights into CSDP policy-
making. In the empirical analysis, data are used from official documents and 105 semi-structured 
interviews with officials from the Council Secretariat, European Commission, member states, and 
international organizations. The interviews have been carried out between 2007 and 2011. These 
sources are complemented by secondary literature.
EXPLAINING THE INFLUENCE OF EU OFFICIALS
The following section provides a rationalist argument to explain the influence of EU officials in the 
CSDP. It first identifies whether EU officials have superior bureaucratic resources in comparison to 
the member states. It subsequently analyses the control mechanism that the member states have at 
their disposal. It finally discusses the opportunities and mechanisms through which EU officials can 
2000) and Dijkstra (2008).
3 The crisis management bureaucracies, which are the topic of this article, have changed little as a result of their 
transfer of the EEAS. Empirical findings from the pre-Lisbon period therefore continue to have relevance. See also 
the conclusion for implications of the Treaty of Lisbon.
3exert influence in the CSDP policy process.
Bureaucratic resources
EU officials require superior bureaucratic resources than the member states if they are to exert any 
influence. Given their limited formal competences in foreign policy, these must primarily be sought 
in their institutional position and expertise. EU officials are renowned for their institutional memory 
resulting from their  continuity (e.g. Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 2006, Westlake and Galloway 
2006). Their central institutional position yields further advantages. They have, for example, an 
excellent  overview  of  the  state  of  negotiations  (Beach  2005).  Due  to  their  relatively  neutral 
reputation, they often serve as a broker. This involves becoming party to privileged information 
(Tallberg 2006). The considerable process expertise of EU officials creates a position of authority as 
guardian of the orthodoxy.
Networks are another important resource for EU officials (e.g. Haas 1992, Peterson 1995). 
Through networks, EU officials can gather information and contact relevant stakeholders by means 
of informal channels. These informal channels are important, as it allows EU officials to go beyond 
formal gatekeepers, such as the Brussels-based diplomats in the committees, who may have strict 
instructions from the capitals. Networks are important at different levels. At a more senior level, the 
High Representative has direct contacts with national ministers and their senior civil servants. Due 
to their institutional position, desk officers in the various crisis management bureaucracies are part  
of the core CSDP networks (Mérand et al. 2010, 2011).
EU officials also possess considerable content expertise (Wall and Lynn 1993, Beach 2005, 
Tallberg  2006,  Biermann  and  Siebenhüner  2009).  Various  CSDP services  have  already  been 
mentioned. The two crisis management directorates, which have recently been merged in the Crisis 
Management Planning Directorate (CMPD), employ around 70 civil servants. They take the lead in 
early planning processes. The EU Military Staff consists of nearly 200 officers and provides the 
member states with planning documents. The CPCC of around 70 officials is in charge of detailed 
civilian planning and strategic  command. The Situation  Centre,  which  employs some 100 civil 
servants, provides security and intelligence assessments (Vanhoonacker et al. 2010).
These  services  are  thus  responsible  for  much of  the information-gathering,  information-
processing, and planning (Dijkstra and Vanhoonacker 2011, Bicchi 2012). Most operations start 
with an options paper by the EU officials. The EU officials then go on a fact-finding mission to the  
theatre. The fact-finding mission in turn provides input for the Crisis Management Concept, which 
is  the first  planning document (Mattelaer  2010).  The EUMS and the CPCC draft  the Strategic 
Options and the Joint Action. While the military headquarters and the member states are responsible 
for the launch and implementation of the operation, EU officials continue to fulfill a liaison function  
between Brussels and the mission. In civilian missions, the CPCC has operational authority over 
implementation  and  directs  the  mission  from  Brussels.  Dealing  on  a  day-to-day  basis  with 
implementation may lead to specialization gains (Hawkins et al. 2006).
Control mechanisms
Delegation to an agent cannot be enjoyed without certain agency losses. As Lake and McCubbins 
(2006, p. 343) succinctly state ‘no pain, no gain.’ This does, however, not mean that influence is 
excessive. Principal-agent literature expects that the member states tolerate some agency loss, as 
EU officials  typically  know better  which policies are  in  the EU's interest.  Control  mechanisms 
nonetheless constrain such influence.
The ultimate control mechanism is re-contracting. If influence becomes excessive, member 
states can take functions back. As EU officials anticipate this, they are naturally wary of exerting 
excessive influence. Member states also put in place checks and balances for day-to-day policy-
4making. Formal decision-making and political-strategic oversight in the CSDP, for example, rests 
with the member states in the committees. The delegation of the CSDP functions among different 
EU institutions including the Presidency and the European Commission (Dijkstra 2009, 2011a) is 
another method of restricting influence (Klein 2010). Through detailed instructions, the member 
states keep a tight rein on EU officials (Hawkins  et al. 2006, Bradley and Kelley 2008). Agent 
selection  ensures  that  the  EU  leadership  has  preferences  close  to  those  of  the  member  states 
(Hawkins et al. 2006).
In  addition  to  such  ‘standard’ control  mechanisms,  member  states  can  also  keep  the 
resources of EU officials limited. EU officials typically do not have a say over their own budget, 
staff or competences. There is also the question of the quality of staff and their loyalties. In the 
CSDP services, there is only a limited amount of permanent officials. Many of the EU officials are 
in fact national secondees. While these officials do not necessarily act as national agents (Trondal 
2006), they undermine the institutional memory, continuity and thus the expertise of the CSDP 
services.4 Few  individuals,  moreover,  have  a  personal  desire  to  promote  institutional  interests 
(Juncos and Pomorska 2010, 2011). By delegating functions to secondees, there is less chance of 
shirking.
A critical control mechanism is the oversight committees. This includes the Political and 
Security Committee at ambassador level, but particularly the underlying working groups. To carry 
out  oversight,  national  diplomats perform, with  the  help  of  their  ministries,  many of  the same 
information-gathering and processing tasks as the EU officials. They can thus be conceptualized as 
small shadow bureaucracies, which have the aim of narrowing informational asymmetries (Lake 
and McCubbins 2006). The quality of oversight in the working groups is, however, conditioned by 
the expertise in the ministries as well as the coordination in the capitals (e.g. Vanhoonacker and 
Jacobs 2010).
There is  an important  difference in  the  oversight  of  military and civilian  missions.  The 
Military  Committee  (EUMC),  composed  of  two-  and  three-star  generals,  is  supported  by  two 
working groups. It deals with one/two operations at the same time and receives instructions directly 
from the defense ministries. The Civilian Committee (CIVCOM), in contrast, consists of junior to 
mid-career diplomats (Cross 2010). It has up to a dozen civilian missions on its agenda and is not 
supported by working groups. Moreover, its instructions come from the interior, justice, and even 
the defense ministries, while the diplomats come from the ministry of foreign affairs. There is in 
this respect tremendous variation among the member states.  Striking is also the lack of civilian 
doctrine  compared with  the  doctrine  resulting  from the  long tradition of  multinational  military 
operations (Benner and Bossong 2010). Doctrine provides member states guidance. The absence of 
civilian doctrine makes it more difficult for them to evaluate proposals of the EU officials.
Opportunities
In case of superior bureaucratic resources and a lack of strong control mechanisms, there are may 
be opportunities for exerting influence (Thatcher and Stone Sweet 2002). They differ throughout the  
policy process. Agenda-setting relates to the ability of EU officials to get certain issues high on the 
agenda (Tallberg 2003, Princen 2007). Apart from their formal right of initiative, they can raise 
awareness through informal  channels (Peters 2001, Pollack 2003).5 Princen and Rhinard (2006) 
distinguish  between  a  political  and  administrative  route  to  agenda-setting.  The  political  route 
involves top-down pressure, while the administrative route is about bottom-up momentum building. 
4 Former Director-General EUMS, Lt. General David Leakey, once said that his staff consisted of ‘swimmers, floaters 
and sinkers.’ He also noted that member states ‘should not treat the EUMS as a language school and a staff college 
by sending unqualified people’ (Impetus 2010, p. 4).
5 The Commission had the shared right of initiative before the Treaty of Lisbon, while the High Representative could 
initiate policy through the Presidency. The Policy Unit could further issue options papers. The Treaty of Lisbon has 
reinforced these formal competences.
5EU officials have the ability to alternate between these political and administrative venues due to 
their  central  institutional  position (Baumgartner and Jones 1991).  When issues get stuck at  one 
level, EU officials can try the other.
EU officials also get very early involved in CSDP missions. This gives them a first mover 
advantage. Such advantage allows for conflict expansion and framing (Princen 2007). By getting 
like-minded member states involved and by keeping opposing actors outside the inner circle, EU 
officials can create momentum. Raising expectations with external parties is another strategy, which 
may result in a fait accompli for the member states. Framing CSDP missions in a way to make them 
more palatable for some of the opposing member states is a final early mover advantage. The later 
one gets involved, the more difficult to change the dominant discourse.
During  decision-making,  EU officials  can affect  the  process  through their  informational 
advantage. By manipulating ‘either the construction of policy alternatives or information about the 
consequences of different alternatives’ (Bendor  et al. 1985, p. 1042, Dahl [1963] 2003), officials 
can exert influence over the member states. They have a particular strong position if they possess 
hidden information (Arrow 1985). More frequently, however, the member states may suffer from 
information  overload  or  information  fragmentation  between  different  actors.  As  a  result,  the 
member states may be incapable of evaluating all policy options in time due to limited information-
processing skills.
During implementation, EU officials can act on their own preferences rather than ‘strictly 
and faithfully [following] the preferences of the member states that created and empowered them’ 
(Pollack 2003, p. 38). Their ability for hidden action is important (Arrow 1985). This implies that 
‘the  agent's  action  is  not  directly  observable  by the  principal’ (Arrow 1985,  p.  37),  but  that  it 
partially affects the payoffs. Hidden action leads directly to influence. Influence is, however, limited 
through the control mechanisms. Particularly important here is the choice of command and control. 
In  military  operations,  the  member  states  rely  on  NATO or  national  assets  for  the  Operations 
Headquarters.6 The situation is different during civilian missions, where the Brussels-based CPCC 
plays  a  central  role  during  implementation.  It  has  the  formal  commanding  authority  over  the 
missions.
Conclusion
From this overview of bureaucratic resources, control mechanisms, and opportunities it is possible 
to come to two preliminary conclusions. First, EU officials have a central institutional position in 
the CSDP policy process. They get early involved in possible operations through planning and fact-
finding. This gives them opportunities for influence in the agenda-setting phase. They can push for 
operations in both political and administrative venue and alternate whenever necessary. Second, EU 
official are expected to exert more influence in civilian operations. The member states have a weak 
control  mechanism in  CIVCOM for  civilian  missions.  In  addition,  expertise  is  scattered  in  the 
capitals between different ministries, which makes coordination difficult. The member states can 
also not rely on civilian doctrine to guide them in evaluating proposals. Finally, EU officials have a 
number of opportunities during civilian implementation, which they do not possess in the military 
missions.
MILITARY AND CIVILIAN OPERATIONS
Operation Althea in Bosnia
6 The Brussels-based Operations Centre was activated for the first time early 2012 for the coordination of the military 
operations in the Horn of Africa. Its purpose is, however, facilitation rather than command.
6Following the Dayton agreement of 1995, the NATO deployed some 60,000 troops to Bosnia. It 
significantly downsized its mission over time to 7000 troops. In December 2004, it handed over the  
military operation to the EU. The EU has made adjustments to the operation as well. At the time of 
writing, discussions continue about the future.
While the relative contribution of the United States to the NATO operation decreased in the 
period 1995–2004, the takeover was by no means automatic. The first signals for the takeover came 
from the EU High Representative Javier Solana (interviews with national officials 2009). He saw 
the operation as part of setting up the EU's institutional structures. ‘The proof of the pudding is in 
the  eating’ (interview with  national  official  2009)  and  a  takeover  from NATO in  the  Western 
Balkans was a logical first step. Solana was supported by France and the United Kingdom. These 
three actors presented planning papers to the Council in February 2003 (Council 2003). The United 
States was not against the takeover, but it was wary of autonomous EU operations (e.g. Operation 
Artemis,  Giegerich  et  al.  2006).  As a  result  of  the transatlantic  tensions over Iraq,  it  therefore 
blocked the handover for six months (interviews with national officials 2009).
Important about the handover was that, following the civil war, the Bosnians had little faith 
in  European  troops.  The  dominant  discourse  was  therefore  one  of  continuity  (interviews  with 
national officials 2009). The EU would have the same number of troops, mandate, capabilities and 
command and control structures as the NATO operation (Council 2003, Financial  Times 2003). 
Solana, on the other hand, thought that the military operation should also have added value for the 
overall effort of the EU in Bosnia.  The mission should help tackle some of the most persistent 
problems and signal that the EU was now in the lead. In a report, Solana (2004) therefore argued for 
a ‘new and distinct mission.’ The EU mission would, after all, be in a ‘very different position from 
that when NATO first deployed’ (Solana 2004). He noted that the operation should contribute to the 
work of  the  High Representative/EU Special  Representative  in  Bosnia and to  the  fight  against 
organized crime.
The member states were less convinced. They noted that these were not traditional military 
tasks and they objected to their military being used for policing tasks (interviews with national 
officials 2009). Moreover, the Commission argued that the Bosnians had to take ownership. Using 
EU troops  for  the  fight  against  organized  crime  was  not  a  good  idea.  In  an  inter-institutional 
competence battle, it also objected to strengthening the EU Special Representative, who reported to 
Solana (interviews with Commission officials  2009). At the end of the day,  more coordination, 
rather than a reallocation of competences, between the actors on the ground was stressed (Council  
2004). The fight against organized crime became eventually a key supporting military task rather 
than a primary objective (Council 2004, Leakey 2006). Apart from the discussions over mandate, 
EU officials did not play a prominent role. They facilitated the negotiations between the EU and 
NATO on practical details, such as the delineation of the mandate, ‘over the horizon’ troops, and the 
role of NATO's regional command in Naples (Bertin 2008).
Discussions over the mandate started once again with the appointment of the first Force 
Commander, General David Leakey. Solana instructed him, during a personal meeting, to carry out 
a ‘new and distinct’ mission using the supporting tasks from the mandate (interviews with Althea 
and national officials 2009). In accordance, Leakey decided to make the fight against organized 
crime the ‘centrepiece  of his  agenda’ (Bertin  2008,  p.  68).  He deployed troops to  combat  fuel 
smuggling at border crossings and to limit illegal logging in the timber industry (Leakey 2006). His 
actions met resistance from many of the member states, the EU Police Mission in Bosnia, and the 
Commission. The five major contributing member states were ‘very, very unenthusiastic, if not in 
opposition, to their military being used this way’ (interview with Althea official 2009). The member 
states eventually reacted by reducing the number of troops in Bosnia after Leakey's departure in 
2005, which equates to post hoc re-contracting. The troubles between the military operation and the 
Police Mission led to more coordination and a stronger role for the EU Special Representative.
Solana thus played a role in getting the handover from NATO on the EU agenda. He took the 
7initiative and teamed up with the important member states. They managed to keep the mission on 
the agenda amidst opposition from the United States during the Iraq crisis. As such, Solana had 
modest influence during agenda-setting. Solana and the CSDP officials were, however, much less 
effective in pursuing their interests in the planning and conduct of the operation. Solana's aim to 
focus on the fight against organized crime met conservatism from the member states in the Military 
Committee.  When Leakey tried to  make the EU operation  ‘new and distinct’ through the fight 
against organized crime, the member states reduced forces. The member states thus exerted clear 
control over EU officials during this operation. Military doctrine presented the member states with 
guidance in this respect.
Military operation in Chad
In 2008, the EU launched a 3700-strong military operation in eastern Chad and the Central African 
Republic for a period of exactly one year. The purpose of this operation was to provide a ‘safe and 
secure environment’ for internally displaced people, refugees from the neighboring Darfur region, 
and personnel from the UN. After the mandate had ended, the UN took over the well-functioning 
military operation.
Shortly after the election of the French President Sarkozy in 2007, France suggested that the 
EU should become engaged in the humanitarian crisis in Darfur (Correspondance européenne, 21 
May 2007). This led to extensive brainstorming between the France and EU officials in the crisis  
management directorates, who were secretly invited to the military headquarters in Paris (interview 
with EU official 2010). It resulted in the Council Secretariat writing an options paper. This gave EU 
officials the opportunity to put forward a realistic plan (Mattelaer 2008). It focussed the attention 
squarely on eastern Chad, where insecurity continued to affect the lives of hundreds of thousands of 
Darfur refugees. Within the UN, a military operation to eastern Chad had already been discussed, 
but the Chadian Government was reluctant to host UN peacekeepers (UN 2007). France together  
with the officials in the crisis management directorates therefore suggested a one-year EU bridging 
operation, after which the UN could take over (interview with Council  Secretariat  and national 
officials 2009, 2010).
The early involvement of EU officials  was important with a view to the framing of the 
operation. From the start it was clear that Germany and the United Kingdom were unenthusiastic 
about this French adventure (Mattelaer 2008, Berg 2009, Dijkstra 2010b). Support from the other 
member states was thus crucial for the operation to materialize. EU officials therefore stressed that 
it was going to be a humanitarian mission in support of activities of the UN. This fitted well with 
‘effective  multilateralism’ as  emphasized  in  the  European Security  Strategy.  Moreover,  the  EU 
would be an impartial actor with respect to local politics and the operation would only last one year. 
It were these conditions that eventually ensured that most of the member states looked favorably at 
the operation (interviews with national officials 2009). In addition, EU officials helped France with 
the complex negotiations on the UN Security Council Resolution 1778. They also raised external 
expectations through a fact-finding mission in August 2007. Finally, they used their position and 
expertise to underestimate the common costs of the operation (interviews with Council Secretariat  
officials 2009, 2010). These costs were a significant concern for Germany and the United Kingdom.
Despite these efforts to make the operation look appealing, the member states remained very 
reluctant to come on board (Dijkstra 2010b). Germany and the United Kingdom simply refused to 
participate in the operation and objected to the common costs. Other member states declined to 
make contributions during the various force generation conferences. It remained difficult for them 
to  see  how the  EU could  be  perceived  as  impartial  given  close  ties  between  France  and  the 
incumbent  regime.  In addition,  they realized that the overall  investment  in eastern Chad would 
serve French interests most (Mattelaer 2008). EU officials could not do much about it. At the end of 
the day, Sarkozy called his counterparts to ask for troop contributions (interviews with national 
8officials 2009). Some of the member states (notably Ireland and Poland) were forthcoming, but 
overall enthusiasm remained limited. Most were happy to politically support the operation, but not  
to send troops.
In addition to these problems with force generation, it took considerable time to activate the 
Operations  Headquarters.  This  resulted  in  a  delay  of  the  operation,  which  only  reached  Initial 
Operational Capability on 15 March 2008. A shortfall in helicopters made the military operation 
less mobile (interview with EUFOR official 2009). Moreover, the situation on the ground differed 
from what the EU had planned for. Instead of confrontations with armed rebels, the EU was faced  
with lower-level petty crime and human rights violations in the refugee camps, for which it was ill-
equipped (Oxfam 2008). The main cause was a security vacuum resulting from the absence of UN 
police trainers. EU officials in Brussels could do little about it. Problems became worse when the 
Security Council failed to agree on time on the handover. The EU eventually had to force the UN to 
do their planning and to arrive on time by means of high-level interventions (interviews with EU 
and UN officials 2009). It still had to make more than 2000 troops and capabilities available for the 
UN force to guarantee an adequate follow-on.
As with the military operation in Bosnia, EU officials played a role in the agenda-setting of 
the mission. While it is difficult to exactly distinguish between France and the CSDP officials in the 
crisis management directorates (some of whom held the French nationality), EU officials clearly 
supported France in creating momentum, framing the operation and eventually pushing it through at 
the political level. The institutional position of the EU officials was critical in this respect. They 
were early involved in the process and their centrality helped them significantly. EU officials, on the 
contrary,  played hardly a role  in the planning, the force generation,  and implementation.  These 
issues were decided by the member states, many of whom lacked enthusiasm for the mission. The 
military-strategic planning and the conduct of the operation were done by the military headquarters 
in Paris.
Aceh Monitoring Mission
The Aceh Monitoring Mission was a direct result from a peace agreement between the Government 
of Indonesia and the Aceh rebels. This peace agreement had been negotiated after the tsunami had 
devastated the province of Aceh in 2004. For 15 months, EU and ASEAN monitors oversaw the  
implementation of the agreement, which included the monitoring of weapons decommissioning and 
the withdrawal of the Indonesian army (2005–2006).
The peace negotiations between the parties, following the tsunami, took place in Helsinki. 
They were mediated by the office of the former Finnish President Ahtisaari. Ahtisaari realized that 
he would not be able to oversee the implementation of an eventual agreement (Accord 2008). In 
January 2005, shortly after the first round of negotiations, he therefore contacted Solana and the 
Deputy Director-General External Relations of the Council Secretariat, Pieter Feith about possible 
EU involvement (Accord 2008). He had known Feith since the 1970s. They told him to ‘go ahead’ 
with mediation (Merikallio 2008, p. 80). Following a second round of negotiations in February, the 
EU planners started to look into a possible monitoring mission. In May, they presented their plans to 
the negotiating parties in Helsinki (Merikallio 2008; interviews with Council Secretariat officials 
2009, 2010). This created external expectations, at least with the negotiating parties, that the EU 
would be involved in the implementation of the peace agreement. These expectations only increased  
when EU officials went on a fact-finding mission to the region in June. It effectively created a fait 
accompli for the member states. The outside world expected the EU to deliver.
The possible Aceh Monitoring Mission was not very popular with the member states. While 
they recognized that the EU could bring added value, only four were initially in favor (Grevi 2005). 
National ambassadors in Jakarta, in fact, had been sending critical signals about the situation on the 
ground (Merikallio 2008; interview with Commission official 2009). Various member states were 
9thus wary about a ‘mission creep.’ Financing the operation was also a particular problem, as the 
CFSP budget was insufficient to cover all expenses. On 26 July, Solana intervened by addressing 
the ambassadors  in Brussels.  He noted that the EU had no other choice than to  undertake  this 
mission (interviews with Council Secretariat, Commission and national officials 2009). Meanwhile, 
EU  officials  creatively  suggested  financing  the  operation  through  ad  hoc  contributions  of  the 
member states. None of the member states was particularly pleased with this solution,  but they 
decided to go along with it. Many noted, however, that the financial structure of this mission did not 
set a precedent (Grevi 2005).
EU officials also played a crucial role in setting the parameters of the mission. Noteworthy 
is the limited mandate, which was only concerned with security issues and excluded development 
and human rights, and the initial six-month duration of the mission (Schulze 2007). This was the 
best means for the EU to declare success and to get out as soon as possible. Moreover, EU officials 
kept  the  total  authorized  strength  of  the  mission  to  a  minimum.  This  was  presented  as  a  fait  
accompli to the negotiating parties and the member states. EU officials furthermore exceptionally 
wrote all the planning documents on the ground in Aceh, because of time pressure and the lack of 
planning staff at headquarters during the summer (interviews with Council Secretariat and national  
officials 2009). Finally, EU planners suggested an Initial Monitoring Presence – unforeseen in the 
peace agreement – to cover for the period between the peace agreement and the deployment of the 
EU monitors. It would avoid an immediate escalation.
EU officials  were also  intensively involved in  the implementation of  the  mission.  Feith 
became the Head of Mission on the ground and he took many of his staff members with him from 
Brussels  to  fill  the  senior  positions.  While  the  decommissioning  of  weapons  was  primarily  a 
Finnish-led  exercise,  Feith pro-actively promoted confidence between the parties.  An important 
example is the Commission on Security Arrangements (COSA). While not foreseen in the peace 
agreement, Feith used these meetings – initially twice per week – to discuss with the parties all 
incidents that had taken place and issues that might threaten the peace agreement. Many observers  
stress  the  importance  of  pro-active  monitoring  (Schulze  2007,  Kirwan  2008;  interviews  with 
mission staff 2009). Feith and his colleagues had an interest in making the operation a success and 
they acted in this regard.
EU officials thus played a crucial role in the Aceh Monitoring Mission. In close cooperation 
with President  Ahtisaari,  the  mission was put  on the  agenda.  EU officials  then raised external  
expectations with the negotiating parties, while keeping the member states out of the loop. Solana 
used his political profile to stress the importance of this mission for the EU. His civil servants found 
a solution to budgetary problems and they used their position as liaison between the negotiating 
parties and the member states to set the important parameters of the mission. After the mission was 
launched, EU officials took up the senior positions in the mission to affect the implementation on 
the ground. Contrary to the previous two military operations, EU officials thus played a major role 
in Aceh. They provided leadership during agenda-setting, creatively wrote the planning documents, 
and affected the actual implementation of the operation on the ground.
Rule of law mission in Kosovo
Following the war in Kosovo in 1999, the UN put in place an international civilian administration.  
Over time, however, calls for formal independence from Serbia increased. In 2005, a status process 
was set in motion under the leadership of President Ahtisaari. The handover of UN responsibilities 
to a EU rule of law mission (EULEX) was a cornerstone in this process. Due to status-related 
problems this handover was messy. Yet since 2008 some 2800 EU and local experts are carrying out 
executive tasks and helping local authorities in the areas of police, justice, and customs.
EU officials have been closely involved in this process. Following the riots in March 2004, 
which triggered the status negotiations, Solana put one of his civil servants, Søren Jessen-Petersen, 
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at the helm of the UN mission (interviews with UN officials 2010). In addition, his Western Balkans  
Director, Stefan Lehne, became involved in the negotiations under Ahtisaari. In the spring of 2005, 
Solana moreover co-authored a paper with Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn on the future EU 
involvement in Kosovo (Solana and Rehn 2005a). One of the major points was that the EU would 
play a key role in Kosovo by taking over functions from the UN. However, the report also noted 
that an EU presence could not be a simple continuation of the UN administration, as the reputation 
of the UN had been badly damaged. The EU would instead focus on the rule of law.
The appointment of Jessen-Peterson led to brainstorming meetings on the ground in Kosovo 
about the future international presence. The EU started to send over experts and over time it became 
conventional wisdom that the EU would take over (interview with UN official 2010). At the end of 
2005, Solana and Rehn wrote a second report (Solana and Rehn 2005b), which suggested a fact-
finding mission. This fact-finding mission, which took place in February 2006, in turn, stated that 
any EU presence  had to  be carefully  planned.  A permanent  planning team on the  ground was 
required. The member states went along and the planning team was established in May. It sent its 
first options paper to the member states in September 2006 (Grevi 2009). In line with the discourse 
of  Solana  (and  of  Ahtisaari),  the  planning  team suggested  a  light  presence  of  less  than  1000 
international staff  members. This light option became unattainable when it  became increasingly 
clear that there would not be an agreement between the Government of Serbia and the authorities of 
Kosovo on status (interviews with planning team, UN and Council Secretariat officials 2010, 2011). 
The member states insisted, for example, on robust anti-riot capabilities, more judges, and border 
guards.7
The disagreements on status also had an impact in Brussels, where the member states were 
divided (Dijkstra 2011b). Because it was difficult to plan on the basis of disagreement, EU officials 
assumed  in  their  documents  that  there  would  be  a  final  agreement  on  status  (interviews  with 
Council Secretariat, national officials 2010). This allowed the planning to go ahead. However, as 
the  Kosovo  dossier  was  divisive,  the  member  states  preferred  not  to  talk  about  it  regularly  – 
particularly not at ambassador level. Since CIVCOM was at a too low level to take real decisions,  
the  process  went  in  circles.  Eventually  EU  officials  had  to  take  many  decisions  themselves 
(interview with Council Secretariat and national officials 2010). The situation was worsened by the 
fact that since EULEX was such ambitious mission, the chain of command for civilian missions 
completely had to be changed. Solana already foresaw this at the Hampton Court European Council 
in October 2005, but it was difficult for the national diplomats in CIVCOM to agree.
In  March  2007,  Ahtisaari  unveiled  his  plan  for  ‘supervised  independence,’ which  was 
endorsed by the Kosovo authorities but rejected by Serbia. This created a stalemate in the UN and 
led  to  the  eventual  unilateral  declaration  of  independence  in  February  2008.  Because  the  UN 
Security Council could not agree, there was no new resolution. This made it difficult for the UN to 
hand over functions (and equipment) to the EU (Dijkstra 2011b). The United States and leading 
member states put tremendous political pressure on the UN; and EU officials worked out technical 
details with UN counterparts (interviews with Council Secretariat and UN officials).
After Serbia finally agreed that the UN would hand over parts of its responsibilities to the 
EU, the mission was launched in December 2008. EULEX reached full  operating capability by 
April  2009.  While  a  new command  and  control  structure  was  established  in  Brussels  for  this 
mission, in practice it has been difficult for the member states to keep control over implementation. 
The sheer size of the operation leads to information overload and CIVCOM delegates have more on 
their agenda than Kosovo. One national interviewee noted ‘[the people in the CPCC] are the real 
experts … I am dealing with nine missions, so it is … difficult to have an in-depth picture’ (2010).  
That having said, the room for EU officials and the mission to manoeuvre is conditioned by the 
tremendous political difficulties on the ground. The mission has been pro-active with arranging 
7 Needless to say, three of the original four Integrated Police Units have withdrawn since the start of EULEX. Their 
added value is limited given the professionalism of the Kosovo Police and the presence of NATO.
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practical matters, but in implementation it came, time and again, across political issues.
EU officials thus played an important role with regard to EULEX. They were very early 
involved (much earlier than all the member states) and they occupied places in all the important  
parts  of  the  process.  Together with Rehn,  Solana  set  some of  the  parameters  of  the  operation, 
although the changing international environment required some adjustments to the initial  plans. 
Assuming settlement, EU officials planned the mission and it became conventional wisdom that the 
EU would take over. EU officials had to take a leadership role, because the member states in the 
committees did not want to discuss Kosovo too often and because they lacked the expertise to get 
this operation off the ground. In the launching and early conduct of the operation, EU officials took 
a pro-active approach. Apart from the institutional role in agenda-setting, EU officials thus exerted 
influence due to their expertise vis-à-vis the member states and the overload of information, which 
the member states have difficulties dealing with.
CONCLUSION
The influence of the EU institutions has historically triggered much scholarly debate. For a long 
time, this debate played particularly in the domain of the internal market and the regulatory policies.  
Foreign policy as the exemplification of ‘high politics’ was generally considered a member states' 
affair (Hoffmann 1966). With the strengthening of the EU bureaucracy, as part of the Treaty of  
Amsterdam and the Cologne European Council, the absence of the EU institutions in foreign policy 
is no longer obvious. The CSDP services in the Council Secretariat,  and now in the EEAS, are 
generally considered important actors in Brussels. This article has analyzed under which conditions 
they exert influence in the policy process.
The empirical evidence suggests that EU officials played a significant role in the agenda-
setting  of  the  CSDP missions  and  that  they  had  more  influence  in  civilian  than  in  military 
operations. Their prominence in agenda-setting can be explained by their central position in policy-
making and their resulting very early involvement in planning. In the case of Bosnia, Solana was an 
early  proponent  of  the  takeover  from NATO. For  the  military  operation  in  Chad,  EU officials 
teamed up with  France.  With regard to  the  Aceh Monitoring Mission,  EU officials  had strong 
contacts with Ahtisaari. As for the rule of law mission in Kosovo, EU officials were omnipresent  
from the beginning and acted with  considerable  foresight.  While  in  all  cases EU officials  thus 
played a role in agenda-setting, it is noteworthy that in military operations they closely cooperated 
with key member states, whereas in civilian missions they were more actors in their own right.
This variation between military and civilian missions was significant as well in the decision-
making and implementation of the CSDP. The efforts  of EU officials to make the operation in 
Bosnia  ‘new  and  distinct’  were  blocked  by  the  member  states.  EU  officials  likewise  faced 
tremendous opposition from some member states and a lack of military contributions in the case of 
Chad. The mission was eventually launched due to intensive French lobbying. The implementation 
took place outside the Brussels’ realm. In civilian crisis management, it was quite a different story. 
EU officials were the main drivers behind getting the Aceh Monitoring Mission approved. They 
suggested the limited mandate and they had an impact on implementation. In the case of Kosovo, 
EU officials pushed for another mandate than that of the UN mission. They took a pro-active role in  
the launch and implementation. For the member states, it was difficult to exercise control due to the 
problems surrounding status and the lack of sufficient civilian expertise at committee level.
The European External Action Service has now taken over all the CSDP services. While 
most of the empirical material dealt with pre-Lisbon policy-making, the crisis management set-up in  
the EU has not changed. One would therefore not expect dramatically different results.  Several 
comments on the changes are needless to say in place. First, the High Representative has received a 
bigger mandate in terms of scope. Not only did she take over Solana's portfolio, she is  also in 
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charge of the external relations bits of the European Commission. It is therefore not a surprise that 
she has taken less of an interest in CSDP and that she has not been pushing for new operations as 
much as Solana had been doing during his terms in office (Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet and Rüger 
2011).8 Second, while prior to Lisbon the chairmanship of the Political and Security Committee and 
CIVCOM rotated  among the  member  states,  they have  become permanent  positions embedded 
within  the  EEAS.  This  has  removed  potential  obstacles  for  EU  officials  to  push  for  their  
preferences, yet it has also resulted in less dynamism.
Overall,  however,  EU  officials  have  retained  their  important  role  in  the  CSDP policy-
making. This article has shown that in a number of instances (agenda-setting and civilian crisis 
management)  they  exert  significant  influence.  In  many  other  instances,  member  states  have 
established relevant control mechanism to avoid excessive influence. One of the challenges of the 
member states, in this respect, is to better organize their civilian crisis management structures. Too 
often, there is a lack of coordination between the different line ministries in the capitals (justice, 
interior, defence, finance, and foreign) and an absence of the necessary expertise. The status of 
CIVCOM can also be increased in Brussels. Without appropriate control mechanisms, EU officials 
will continue to benefit.
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